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NOTE
PROPERTY, WAR OBJECTIVES, AND
SLAVE LABOR CLAIMS:
THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S POLITICAL
QUESTION ANALYSIS IN ALPERIN v.
VATICAN BANK
INTRODUCTION

Igor Najfeld was born in Yugoslavia on June 28, 1944, the same day
his mother and father escaped from three years of slave labor at the
hands of the Nazi-controlled government in Croatia, ("the Ustasha,,).l
Najfeld's grandparents were murdered by the Ustahsa, along with at least
fifty-six members of his mother's relatives? All of Najfeld's relatives
lost their property, which included a department store and other assets, to
the Ustasha regime. 3
Five decades later, Najfeld, along with twenty-three other survivors
of the Ustasha regime and four organizations ("Holocaust Survivors")
brought a suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of California against the Istituto per Ie Opere di Religione, also known as
the Vatican Bank, for crimes allegedly committed in connection with the
Ustasha regime during and after World War 11.4 The suit also named the
I Third Amended Complaint by Plaintiff at'll IS, Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 242 F. Supp. 2d
686
(N.D.
CaL
2003)
(No.
C99-494I
MMC),
(available
at
http://www.vaticanbankclaims.comlvatcom.htm) (last visited 2/20106).
2 1d.
3 1d .
4 Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 2005). em. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1141
(2006), eert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1160 (2006).

19

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2006

1

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 4

20

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

Order of Friars Minor and the Croatian Liberation Movement as
defendants. s The Order of Friars Minor is more generally recognized as
the organization of Franciscan Monks, and includes Franciscans from
around the world. 6 The Croatian Liberation Movement is allegedly the
successor organization to the Ustasha, and allegedly has been involved in
terrorism in the United States and other places. 7 The Holocaust
Survivors claim that the Vatican Bank, the Order of Friars Minor, and the
Croatian Liberation Movement were complicit in and profited from
crimes committed during World War II by the Ustasha. 8 The Holocaust
Survivors' claims included conversion, unjust enrichment (including
profit from slave labor), restitution, the right to an accounting, human
rights violations and violations of international law, including war
crimes, crimes against peace, torture, rape, and genocide. 9
The parties agreed to limit initial district court arguments to the
application of the political question doctrine to the controversy, and
District Court Judge Maxine Chesney dismissed all claims as
nonjusticiable political questions. \0 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, in a majority opinion written by Judge M. Margaret McKeown,
addressed the defendants' contention that the claims were nonjusticiable
political questions. I I The majority founded its decision on a demarcation
between - what the court labeled as - property claims (conversion, unjust
enrichment, restitution, and the right to an accounting) and war
objectives claims (violations of human rights and international law).12
The court permitted the property claims to proceed and dismissed the
war objectives claims as political questions. 13
This Note will analyze the Ninth Circuit's decision in Alperin v.
Vatican Bank,14 and propose that while the court's demarcation between
property claims and war objectives claims may be a sound analytical
method for addressing political question doctrine issues, the slave labor
claims should not have been excluded from the scope of the property
claims.
Part I of this Note will provide a background of the political

1d.
6 1d. at 542.
7 1d.
8 1d. at 538.
9 1d.
10 Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 242 F. Supp. 2d 686, 689 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
II Alperin, 410 F.3d at 537-538.
12 See Id. at 547 -562.
I3 Id. at 562.
14 Id. at 538, cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1141 (2006), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1160 (2006).
5
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question doctrine, its case law and history, with a focus on political
questions involving foreign relations. 15 Part II will provide a background
and analysis of the majority opinion in Alperin v. Vatican Bank,16
particularly the court's distinction between property and war objectives
claims. 17 Part III will show that the court's demarcation between
property and war objectives claims is a useful tool in resolving political
question issues. 18 Finally, Part IV will argue that, given the distinction
between property and war objectives claims, the Ninth Circuit should
have included the slave labor claims within the scope of the property
claims and not within the war objectives claims. 19 This Note ultimately
concludes that the slave labor claims are not political questions and are
therefore justiciable.2o
I.

BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE POLITICAL QUESTION
DOCTRINE

The political question doctrine is one of the justiciability doctrines
that limit the cases and controversies the Federal Judiciary will decide. 21
The political question doctrine originates from comments made by Chief
Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison. 22 Chief Justice Marshall
wrote that "[q]uestions, in their nature political, or which are, by the
constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in
this court.'.23 The primary purpose of the political question doctrine is to
support the separation of powers between the three branches of the
federal government. 24 The political branches of government - the
Congress and the Executive - have roles distinct from the Judiciary, and
the Judiciary must respect those distinctions?5 Still, the courts must
determine whether a political question exists because the United States

See infra notes 21-102 and accompanying text.
Alperin, 410 F.3d at 538, cen. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1141 (2006), cerro denied, 126 S. Ct.
1160 (2006).
17 See infra notes 103-205 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 206-221 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 222-233 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 234-235 and accompanying text.
21 See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 28 (Aspen 2001). "There are
five major justiciability doctrines: the prohibition against advisory opinions, standing, ripeness,
mootness, and the political question doctrine. All must be met for any federal court, at any level, to
hear a case."
22 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 170 (1803); see also Alperin, 410 F.3d at 544.
23 Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 170; see also Alperin, 410 F.3d at 544.
24 Baker V. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,210 (1962).
25 [d. at 210-211.
15

16
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Supreme Court is the "ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.,,26
A.

MODERN POLITICAL QUESTION ANALYSIS UNDER BAKER V. CARR

Modem political question analysis originates in the landmark case
of Baker v. Carr. 27 In Baker, a case in which the plaintiffs alleged
mal apportionment of Tennessee Assembly seats, the Supreme Court
described six situations in which a nonjusticiable political question
exists. 28 The six situations are:
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to
a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of
the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made;
or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
.
departments on one questIOn.
. 29
pronouncements by varIOus

Only if one or more of these "formulations is inextricable from the case
at bar" should a court find a nonjusticiable political question. 3D
The Court in Baker limited the political question doctrine to ensure
that courts do not improperly find a case nonjusticiable. 31 For example,
the "doctrine . . . is one of 'political questions,' not one of 'political
cases. ",32 Thus, even though a decision in a case might implicate one of
the political branches, the political question doctrine will not bar the case
unless it implicates one of the six formulations?3 Moreover, whether the
political question doctrine bars a particular case must be decided
individually, on a case by case basis, because it is impossible to resolve
these issues "by any semantic cataloguing. ,,34

26
27

Id . at 211.
Id. at 186.

Id. at 187-188, 217.
Id . at 217.
30 Id .
28
29

31

32
33

34

Id .
Id .
Id .
Id .
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A DESCRIPTION OF THE SIX-PRONG TEST IN BAKER

Baker set forth six independent tests to determine whether dismissal
is required under the political question doctrine. 35 These tests, however,
"are more discrete in theory than in practice," and tend to overlap.36 The
Supreme Court has indicated that the six prongs are "probably listed in
descending order of both importance and certainty.,,37 Because any of
the six Baker tests can be dispositive, it is worthwhile to examine the
meaning of each prong separately.38
1.

Textually Demonstrable Constitutional Commitment

The first prong requires dismissal if a decision is entrusted to a
nonjudicial branch of government and the court can demonstrate this
entrustment in the text and structure of the constitution. 39 The text of the
Constitution explicitly commits certain powers to a nonjudicial branch,
including Congress's power to declare war and to raise an arm/o and the
President's power, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make
treaties. 41 The Judiciary lacks the power to decide cases which
However, many textually
improperly intrude on these powers. 42
demonstrable commitments are not explicit, and must be inferred from
the text and structure of the Constitution. 43
The power to try impeachments is an example of a textual
Constitutional commitment to a nonjudicial branch, and the Supreme
Court has inferred a prohibition on judicial review of the Senate's
impeachment tria\s.44 In Nixon v. United States, the Supreme Court
addressed the question of whether federal courts can review the
procedures used by the Senate in its impeachment trials. 45 In that case,
Federal District Court Judge Walter Nixon, Jr. was accused of making

35

Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277 (2004); Baker, 369 U.S. at 217; see Alperin, 410 F.3d

at 544.
Alperin, 410 F.3d at 544; see Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224,228-229 (1993).
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278.
38 Alperin, 410 F.3d at 547.
39 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
40 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. II, 12 (Clause II grants Congress the power to "To declare
War ... "; Clause 12 grants Congress the power "To raise and support Armies .... ").
41 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
42 See e.g. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 997, 1002-1006 (1979) (plurality opinion
discussing the power to terminate treaties).
43 Nixon, 506 U.S. at 240 (White, J. concurring); see Alperin, 4\0 F.3d at 549.
44 Nixon, 506 U.S. at 226.
36

37

45

[d.
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false statements to a grand jury in a case investigating bribery.46 Judge
Nixon was convicted and sentenced to prison. 47 Because he refused to
resign from the Federal Judiciary, Judge Nixon continued to collect his
salary and benefits while in prison.48 The House of Representatives
adopted three articles of impeachment for high crimes and
misdemeanors, and the Senate convicted Judge Nixon on two of the
articles. 49 Judge Nixon claimed that the Constitution prohibited the
procedures adopted by the Senate, which permitted a committee to take
evidence and testimony, rather than the full Senate. 50
The Supreme Court interpreted the Constitution's Impeachment
Clause to reach its decision that the case was a political question. 51 The
word "sole" in the Constitution indicates that the Senate is the only
governmental branch with the power to conduct impeachment trialS. 52
Thus, even though the courts are not explicitly barred from exercising
judicial review of impeachments, the Court in Nixon held that the
Judiciary does not have the power to review impeachment trials because
the text of the Constitution commits the power to try impeachments to
the Senate. 53
2.

Judicially Discoverable and Manageable Standards

Courts must also dismiss a case if no judicially discoverable or
manageable standard exists by which a court can resolve a case. 54 The
Supreme Court recently addressed this prong of the Baker test in Vieth v.
Jubilirer. 55 The plaintiffs in Vieth alleged that the Pennsylvania
Congressional districts were unconstitutional because of political
gerrymandering. 56 Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for a plurality,
concluded that no judicially discoverable or manageable standard existed

46
47

48

49
50

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 226-228.
[d. at 227-228.

51 [d. at 229-233; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (''The Senate shall have the sole Power to try
all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the
President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: and no Person shall be
convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.").
52 Nixon, 506 U.S. at 229.
53 [d. at 238.
54 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217; see also Vieth, 541 U.S. at 277-278.
55 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 267.
56/d. at 271-273.
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for deciding political gerrymandering cases. 57 Justice Anthony Kennedy
agreed that no standards currently exist, but refused to foreclose the
possibility that workable standards might be discovered in the future. 58
The plurality held that "judicial action must be governed by
standard, by rule.,,59 While Congress can be "inconsistent, illogical, and
ad hoc" in its laws, "[the] law pronounced by the courts must be
principled, rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions.,,6o The courts
simply cannot provide a reasoned distinction as to why a particular
district should be drawn in a particular place and not in another. 61
According to the plurality, even if political gerrymandering exists, the
courts are not equipped to resolve these cases based on reasoned
distinctions. 62
3.

Initial Policy Determination
If a court cannot decide a case without making a policy judgment

which must first be determined by a nonjudicial branch, the case must be
dismissed as a political question. 63 In Gilligan v. Morgan, the Supreme
Court analyzed a case brought by victims of National Guard violence at
Kent State University in 1970.64 The plaintiffs sought an injunction to
prevent premature deployment of National Guard troops to civil
disorders and an injunction against future violations of students'
Constitutional rights. 65 The plaintiffs were not requesting damages for
past injury resulting from unlawful action, and were not attempting to
prevent imminent unlawful action, but brought the action to establish
continuing judicial control over the Ohio National Guard. 66
The Judiciary could not resolve the case in favor of the plaintiffs
without making a policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
determination. 67 Resolution in favor of the students would require
"continuing surveillance by a federal court over the training, weaponry
and orders of the [National] Guard," which would require an inquiry into

Id. at 281.
Id. at 306 (Kennedy, 1. concurring).
59 Id. at 278.
60 Id.
61 /d. at 280-281.
57

58

62/d.

Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1,3 (1973).
65 Id. at 3.
66 Id. at 5.
67 Id. at 7-8.
63

64
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proper law enforcement policy and procedures. 68 The power to set
National Guard policy· is not entrusted to the Judiciary, but to the
Executive and Congress. 69 As well as violating the first Baker prong, the
case would require improper determinations of policy which belong to a
nonjudicial branch.7o
4.

Lack of Respect Due the Coordinate Branches of Government
If adjudication of a case would show a lack of respect owed to a

coordinate branch of government, the case is a nonjusticiable political
question. 7! However, simply interpreting the Constitution does not, by
itself, show a lack of respect for a coordinate branch.72 Nor does a
court's exercise of judicial review of a Congressional statute show a lack
of respect for a coordinate branch.73 In Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner
Bank AG, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit analyzed a case
against two German banks alleging theft of the plaintiff s interest in a
manufacturing company during World War 11.74 The court found that the
claims were not political questions, but upheld dismissal of the claims on
other grounds. 75
The court in Ungaro interpreted the Foundation Agreement, which
is an agreement created by the United States and Germany to resolve
World War II-era claims against German companies. 76 The United
States, in compliance with requirements in the Foundation Agreement,
filed a statement of interest urging that the Foundation Agreement should
be the exclusive forum for resolution of these claims. 77 The Eleventh
Circuit decided that judicial resolution of the claims would not show lack
of respect due the coordinate branches of government solely because of
the Executive's statement of interest. 78 Although such statements are
entitled to respect and deference, they are not decisive. 79 Resolution of
the claims would not place demands on foreign governments, thereby

69

[d. at 7.
[d.

70

[d. at 8.

68

Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1001.
73 United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 390, 391 (1990).
74 Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d 1227, 1229 (11th Cir. 2004).
75 [d. at 1232, 1235.
76 [d. at 1234.
77 [d. at 1236.
71

72

78

79

[d.
[d.
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showing disrespect for the Executive's foreign policy decisions. 8o The
Foundation Agreement itself contemplated judicial involvement in
similar cases. 81
5.

Unquestioning Adherence to a Policy Decision Already Made

If resolution of a claim would interfere with the need to adhere to a
policy decision made by another branch, a court should dismiss the claim
as a political question. 82 If a claim does not implicate a nonjudicial
policy decision, then no need exists to adhere to a policy determination. 83
In Klinghoffer v. S.N. C. Achille Lauro, the Palestine Liberation
Organization challenged the justiciability of a tort suit filed against it for
the death of a passenger which occurred during the highjacking of a
cruise ship.84 Although the specific grounds of the political question
defense were not entirely clear, the Palestine Liberation Organization
claimed that the case "raise[d] foreign policy questions and political
questions in a volatile context lacking satisfactory criteria for judicial
determination.,,85 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected
the Palestinian Liberation Organization's argument that the claims were
political questions. 86 Regarding the fifth prong of the Baker test, the
Second Circuit stated that no adherence was required because "no prior
political decisions are questioned--or even implicated-by the matter
before US.,,87

6.

Multifarious Pronouncementi8

If resolution of a claim could cause embarrassment as a result of
multifarious pronouncements from different branches, a court should
dismiss the claim as a political question. 89 In a case brought by
conservation groups to enforce an international anti-whaling agreement

[d. at 1236 n.12.
/d. at 1235.
82 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
83 Alperin, 410 F.3d at 557-558 (citing Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 50
(2d Cir. 1999), and Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1047 (9th Cir.
1983)).
84 Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 45.
85 [d. at 49.
86 [d. at 50.
87 [d.
80

81

88 Multifarious is "having a great variety and diversity." Concise Oxford Dictionary 936
(Judy Pearsall, ed., 10th ed. 1999).
89 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
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against Japan, the Supreme Court addressed the sixth Baker prong. 90 The
Japanese argued that resolution of the claim would cause embarrassment
because it would require the Judiciary to order the Secretary of
Commerce to repudiate an international agreement. 91 The Supreme
Court disagreed, and held that the interpretation of statutes, treaties, and
executive agreements was the business of the courts, even if contrary to
the opinion of another branch. 92
C.

CATEGORIES OF POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE CASES

Political question cases have, despite the impossibility of
"resolution by any semantic cataloguing," fallen into several broad
categories. 93 For example, cases invoking the Guaranty Clause of the
Constitution have been found to involve the political question doctrine. 94
"Under this article of the Constitution it rests with Congress to decide
what government is the established one in a State.,,95 Other categories of
political question have included, for example, the duration of hostilities
during war96 and the status of Indian tribes,97 although again, these
categories are not absolute. 98
Many political question doctrine cases involve foreign relations. 99
The Supreme Court has stated, "[tlhe conduct of the foreign relations of
our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and
legislative-'the political' -departments of the government, and the
propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is
not subject to judicial inquiry or decision."loo The Court in Baker
carefully limited this idea, however: "[Ilt is error to suppose that every
case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial
cognizance.,,101 Rather, each question must be analyzed individually for
Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221. 224. 228-230 (1986).
[d. at 229.
92 [d. at 230. The Court decided against the conservation groups on other grounds. [d. at
240-241.
93 Baker. 369 U.S. at 217.
94 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 ('The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Fonn of Government .... ); Baker, 369 U.S. at 218-229; Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7
How.) 1,42 (1849) ("Under [the Guarantee Clause] article of the Constitution it rests with Congress
to decide what government is the established one in a State.").
95 Baker, 369 U.S. at 220 (quoting Luther, 48 U.S. (I How.) at 42-44).
96 [d. at 213-215.
97 [d. at 215-217.
98 [d. at 216-217.
99 [d. at 211-214.
100 [d. at 212 n.31 (quoting Oetjen v. Central Lether Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918».
lOl [d. at 211.
90

91
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"its susceptibility to judicial handling . . . " and the "possible
consequences of judicial action.,,102

II.

ANALYSIS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT OPINION IN ALPERIN V. VATICAN
BANK

The plaintiffs in Alperin claimed that the defendant organizations
were complicit in and profited from the crimes committed by the Ustasha
during World War 11. 103 At the district court, the parties agreed to limit
initial arguments to whether the claims should be dismissed because of
the political question doctrine. I04 The Ninth Circuit reversed, in part, the
district court decision dismissing claims brought by the Holocaust
Survivors against the Vatican Bank and other defendants. 105
A.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

From 1941 until 1945, the Ustasha controlled the state of Croatia
and portions of the former Soviet Union.106 The victims were subject to
systematic extermination by the Ustasha with the help of German forces,
and suffered physical, monetary, and property losses, including being
used as slave labor. 107 As many as 700,000 people, mostly Serbs, were
murdered in Ustasha death camps. lOS According to the plaintiffs, the
Vatican and other Catholic institutions supported, or at least turned a
blind eye to the atrocities. lo9 Following the end of World War II, the
Vatican was allegedly complicit in funneling money from the Ustasha to
its own coffers. I 10
The class action was brought on behalf of "[a]ll Serbs, Jews, and
former Soviet Union citizens (and their heirs and beneficiaries), who

102

[d. at 211-212.

103

Alperin, 410 F.3d at 538.

104

Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 242 F. Supp. 2d at 689.

105

Alperin, 410 F.3d at 538, 562-563, rev'g in part Alperin, 242 F. Supp. 2d 686 (N.D. Cal.

106

Alperin, 242 F. Supp. 2d at 687 (citing Third Amended Complaint by Plaintiff at 'll'lI 1,43).

2003).
107

Third Amended Complaint by Plaintiff at 'Ill.

108

Alperin, 410 F.3d at 540 (citing BUREAU OF PuB. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PuB.

No. 10557, U.S. ALLIED WARTIME AND POSTWAR RELATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH
ARGENTINA, PORTUGAL, SPAIN, SWEDEN, AND TuRKEY ON LOOTED GoLD AND GERMAN EXTERNAL
ASSETS AND U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT THE FATE OF THE WARTIME USTASHA TREASURY,
SUPPLEMENT TO THE PRELIMINARY STUDY ON U.S. AND ALLIED EFFORTS TO RECOVER AND
RESTORE GoLD AND OTHER ASSETS STOLEN OR HIDDEN BY GERMANY DURING WORLD WAR II,
142 (1998) ("Ustasha Treasury Report")).
109 [d. at 540.
110

[d. at 540, 543.
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suffered" losses under the Ustasha regime. 111 Named plaintiffs in this
action include victims of personal and property crimes committed by the
Ustasha. 112 Additionally, four organizations that represent Holocaust
Survivors and human rights organizations are named as plaintiffs. I 13 The
class is potentially massive, and could include "over 300,000 former
slave and forced laborers, prisoners, concentration camp, and ghetto
survivorS.,,114 The class could extend geographically from the former
Soviet Union to the former Yugoslavia, including Croatia, Bosnia,
Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. 115
The defendants in Alperin include the Vatican Bank, but not the
Vatican. 116 The plaintiffs alleged, and the Ninth Circuit accepted for the
limited purposes of a motion to dismiss, that the Vatican Bank and the
Vatican are distinct institutions.ll7 The Vatican Bank is headed by a
Vatican official, but conducts for-profit banking transactions worldwide,
including in the United States. I IS Any suit against the Vatican itself
might be subject to dismissal for reasons of sovereign immunity. 119 Still,
the Bank's dealings, transactions, and holdings are difficult to
ascertain. 120 Other defendants include the Order of Friars Minor and the
Croatian Liberation Movement, as well as other unknown Catholic
religious organizations and known and unknown banking institutions
.
f
. 121
f rom a vanety
0 countnes.
The plaintiffs alleged causes of action for conversion, unjust
enrichment, restitution, the right to an accounting, human rights
violations and violations of international law. 122 The plaintiffs claim
subject matter jurisdiction under several federal statutes, California state
law, international law, and common law. 123
III

112

Third Amended Complaint by Plaintiff at ,)[15; Alperin, 410 F.3d at 541.
Alperin, 242 F. Supp. 2d at 687.

113

Id .

114

Alperin, 410 F.3d at 541.

115

Id.

116

Id. at 541-542.

117

Id. at 542.
Id .

118

See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486-487 (1983).
Alperin, 410 F.3d at 542 n.6. A former U.S. Department of Justice Nazi-hunting officer is
quoted as saying, "The Vatican Bank is one of the most secretive financial institutions in the world.
The exact nature and ownership of the Vatican Bank is difficult to ascertain owing to the secrecy
surrounding it." Alperin, 410 F.3d at 542.
121 Id. at 541-542.
122 Id. at 543.
123 The plaintiffs claim federal subject matter jurisdiction under the "Alien Tort Statute, 28
U.S.c. § 1350 ... , the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605 ... , 28 U.S.C. § 1331,
federal common law to the extent it incorporates customary intemationallaw and treaties, diversity
119

120
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The Vatican Bank and Order of Friars Minor filed separate motions
in the district court to dismiss the plaintiff s Complaint. 124 The parties
agreed to limit discussion to "whether the plaintiffs' claims should be
dismissed under the political question doctrine.,,125 The United States
District Court for the Northern District of California held that the claims
were nonjusticiable political questions and dismissed the case. 126 In a
separate opinion, the district court dismissed the claims against the
Croatian Liberation Movement for lack of personal jurisdiction. 127 The
Ninth Circuit upheld the dismissal of claims against the Croatian
Liberation Movement because the courts lacked personal jurisdiction. 128
However, the Ninth Circuit permitted several of the plaintiffs' claims to
proceed against the remaining defendants, holding that the claims were
not barred by the political question doctrine. 129
B.

THE MAJORITY'S REASONING IN ALPERIN V. VATICAN BANK

The majority in Alperin held that some of the Holocaust Survivors'
claims, dubbed property claims, were not political questions. 130 The
majority also dismissed certain claims, dubbed war objectives claims, as
political questions.13I The foundation of the majority's position is the
demarcation between the property and human rights claims. The court
classified the claims according to whether they are property claims or
war objectives claims rather than addressing the claims as a whole or
each claim individually as it appeared in the Complaint. 132 The
Complaint did not list causes of action for war objectives claims and
property claims; rather, the plaintiffs alleged causes of action for
conversion, unjust enrichment, the right to an accounting, restitution, and
human rights violations and violations of international law .133 The court
classified the causes of action for conversion, unjust enrichment,
restitution, and accounting, as property claims.134 The causes of action
jurisdiction, and California state law." [d. at 541.
124 Alperin, 242 F. Supp. 2d at 687.
125 [d. at 689.
126 [d. at 695.
127 Alperin v. Vatican Bank, No. C99-494l MMC(EDL), 2003 WL 21303209, at *5 (N.D.
Cal. May 29, 2003).
128 Alperin, 410 F.3d at 562.
129

[d.

130

[d.

131

[d.

[d. at 548.
[d. at 543; see Third Amended Complaint by Plaintiff at 'll'II 76-97.
134 Alperin, 410 F.3d at 548.
J32
133
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for human rights violations and violations of intemationallaw, including
the slave labor claims, were classified as war objectives claims. 135
By classifying the claims into property and war objectives
categories, the court attempted to make the determination of justiciability
for the property claims predictable while making the finding of
nonjusticiability for the war objectives claims inevitable. War is the
business of the political branches, not the judiciary .136 In contrast, the
property claims are "garden-variety legal and equitable claims for the
recovery of property," and do not involve the sticky foreign relations
issues which might implicate the political question doctrine. 13 ?
1.

The Justiciability of the Property Claims

After distinguishing between the property and war objectives
claims, the court spent considerable effort to show why the property
claims were justiciable under each Baker test. 138 According to the court,
each of the six Baker tests must be addressed because "any single test
can be dispositive.,,139
a.

Textually Demonstrable Constitutional Commitment

First, the court noted that the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly
commit the property claims to a nonjudicial branch.14o "[T]here are few,
if any, explicit and unequivocal instances in the Constitution of this sort
of textual commitment .... ,,141 Thus, courts must infer whether a textual
commitment exists from the text and structure of the Constitution. 142
The court in Alperin recognized that foreign relations are generally
managed by the political branches and that courts consistently defer to
the other branches of government in matters of foreign relations. 143 As
the Court in Baker pointed out, however, courts must also understand
that political question analysis must proceed on a case by case basis, and
135

[d.

136 See e.g. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. II, 12 (Clause 11 grants Congress the power to ''To
declare War ... "; Clause 12 grants Congress the power "To raise and support Armies .... "); see
also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. I (''The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy .... ").
137 Alperin, 410 F.3d at 548.
138 [d. at 548-558.
139 [d. at 547.
140 [d. at 549.

[d. at 549 (quoting Nixon, 506 U.S. at 240-241 (White, J., concurring».
Nixon, 506 U.S. at 240 (White, J. concurring); see Alperin, 410 F.3d at 549.
143 Alperin, 410 F.3d at 549.

141

142
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"it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches
foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance."I44
Perhaps the most important determination in the section analyzing
the first Baker prong is that no treaty or executive agreement expressly
bars the Holocaust Survivors' claims.145 The court pointed out that the
Executive Branch has not committed the United States to a particular
course of action regarding Ustasha-related claims, as it had for example,
with the Japanese Peace Treaty, which precluded all claims arising out of
Japanese actions during World War 11. 146 The majority agreed that the
presence or absence of a treaty or executive agreement is not strictly
determinative of whether a political question exists. 147 However, the
court reiterated that the real question is not whether an agreement or
treaty exists, but whether a demonstrable textual commitment of the
claims to another branch of government exists under the constitution. 148
According to the court in Alperin, "[r]eparation for stealing, even during
wartime, is not a claim that finds textual commitment in the
Constitution. ,,149
The court in Alperin pointed out that the property claims are similar
to claims in earlier cases that involve looted assets that did not implicate
the political question doctrine. 150 According to the majority, the
Holocaust Survivors' claims are analogous to those asserted in Republic
of Austria v. Altmann, 151 which permitted claims against an Austrian
State art gallery for recovery of six paintings stolen during World War
II. 152 Because the Supreme Court did not address the political question
doctrine in Altmann, that decision cannot be used as a direct proposition
that the claims are not political questions. 153 However, the Altmann
claims involved looted assets, which is useful in determining
[d. at 550 (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 211).
See /d. at 549-550.
146 [d.
144

145

147
148

[d. at 550-551.
[d. at 551.

149 [d. at 551. In his dissent, Judge Trott argued that a treaty with Italy should decide the
outcome of the case. [d. at 567-568 (Trott, J. dissenting). The majority rejected this proposition
because the Vatican is a sovereign entity separate from Italy, and was not party to the treaty. [d. at
550 n.11. Moreover, the Court "must accept the Complaint's demarcation between the Vatican
Bank, which is named as a defendant, and the Vatican, which is not .... " [d. at 550. Thus, no
treaty or executive agreement controls the outcome of the case.
150 [d. at 551 (citing Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004) and Urtited States
v. Portrait of Wally, No. 99 Civ. 9940, 2002 WL 553532,2002 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS 6445 (S.D. N.Y.
2002».
151 Altmann, 541 U.S. 677.
152 Alperin, 410 F.3d at 551 (citing Altmann, 541 U.S. 677).
153

[d.
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justiciability because the Alperin claims also involve looted assets. 154
The court also discussed United States v. Portrait of Wally, ISS in which
the United States brought an action involving looted assets. 156 The
majority argued that, like Altmann and Portrait of Wally, the property
claims are really allegations that the defendant is wrongfully holding
assets. IS?
b.

Judicially Discoverable and Manageable Standards

The second prong of the Baker test requires a court to determine
whether the courts can apply "judicially discoverable and manageable
standards" to resolve the case, or whether the judiciary is not equipped to
adjudicate the claim before the court. ISS The majority pointed to Vieth v.
Jubelirer, in which a Supreme Court plurality declared political
gerrymandering cases nonjusticiable under the second Baker prong: 159
Lest there be any doubt, Vieth refines and redirects the inquiry [into
the second Baker prong]. In light of the Court's clarification in Vieth,
we take a slightly different approach to interpreting the phrase
')udicially discoverable and manageable standards." Instead of
focusing on the logistical obstacles, we ask whether the courts are
capable of granting relief in a reasoned fashion or, on the other hand,
whether allowing the Property Claims to go forward would merely
provide "hope" without a substantive legal basis for a ruling. 160

Courts have been utterly unable to find workable standards for resolving
political gerrymandering cases. 161 Conversely, courts routinely resolve
common law property claims based on settled legal standards. 162
That the Holocaust Survivors' claims face daunting evidentiary
hurdles does not mean that courts are unable to apply a judicially

[d. at 551.
Portrait of Wally, No. 99 Civ. 9940, 2002 WL 553532,2002 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS 6445.
156 Alperin, 410 F.3d at 551 (citing Portrait of Wally, No. 99 Civ. 9940, 2002 WL 553532,
2002 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS 6445).
157 Alperin, 410 F.3d at 551.
158 [d. at 552 (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
159 [d. at 552-555 (discussing Vieth, 541 U.S. at 267). Although Justice Kennedy concurred
with the decision in Vieth, he declined to join the plurality in holding that all gerrymandering cases
are nonjusticiable; courts might discover a plausible system to address gerrymandering in the future,
but have not yet done so. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306.
160 Alperin, 410 F.3d at 553 (citing Vieth, 541 U.S. at 304).
161 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 280.
162 Alperin, 410 F.3d at 553.
154

155
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discoverable or manageable standard. 163
Rather, claims seeking
compensation for stolen property are common types of claims, and
include common law tort rules that are settled and easily applied by the
district court. l64 Similarly, courts can use such innovations as the
Manual for Complex Litigation, special masters, and the innovations of
modern class action certification analysis to help overcome the problems
of large complex litigation. 165 Although the property claims are
complicated and face difficulties, they are the kind of claims which
courts regularly decide based on reasoned distinctions. 166 Thus, this
prong of the Baker test is not a bar.
c.

Necessity for an Initial Policy'Determination

The third prong of the Baker analysis prohibits claims which require
an "initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion.,,167 The majority argued that the Holocaust Survivors'
property claims do not require any improper pronouncements on United
States foreign policy.168 Therefore, an initial pronouncement from a
nonjudicial source need not be obtained. 169 Moreover, the property
claims do not require the courts to make pronouncements on foreign
policy.170 Thus, the third Baker prong is thus not applicable.
d.

Lack of Respect for the Coordinate Branches of Government

The fourth prong of the Baker analysis requires dismissal if the
Judiciary cannot address a claim without showing a lack of respect for
the coordinate branches of government. 171 The analysis in this section of
the majority's decision rests on the lack of Executive involvement in the
163

[d.

[d. at 553-554 (citing Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 49).
See Fed. R. Civ. P. § 53(b)(ii); see also Allen-Myiand, Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 770
F. Supp. 1014, 1023 (E.D. Pa. 1991) ("The language of the Rule [53] ... specifically provides for
reference to special master in non-jury trials for 'matters of account and of difficult computation of
damages"'.).
166 Alperin, 410 F.3d at 554.
The Court disapproves of the "somewhat anachronistic"
Kelberine v. Societe [ntemationale, a case dismissing World War II claims as too large to be
judicially manageable. Kelberine did not involve the Baker tests, and was a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Alperin, 410 F.3d at 554 (discussing
Kelberine v. Societe Intemationale, 363 F.2d 989 D.C. Cir. 1966)).
167 Alperin, 410 F.3d at 555 (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
168 [d. at 555.
164

165

169

[d ..

170

[d.

171

[d. (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
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Holocaust Survivors' claims. The Holocaust Survivors apprised the
State Department of the case and appeal and the State Department did
not intervene. 172 The State Department's decision not to intervene may
not be used to determine the position of the State Department or
Executive Branch.173 However, the lack of a response or statement
means that the court has no basis for holding that dismissal is required to
avoid disrespect to either of the political branches. 174 Perhaps, as the
dissent noted, these claims are simply a way to force the Executive
Branch to negotiate a settlement. 175 Still, the court allowed for the
possibility of barring the claims as political questions should the
Executive Branch intervene later by making a pronouncement which
would implicate this prong in the Baker analysis. 176
e.

Unusual Need for Unquestioning Adherence to a Policy Decision
Already Made

The fifth Baker prong requires dismissal of political questions
resulting from "an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made."m The court's reasoning for this prong
is simple: because no policy decision was previously made by the
political branches, there is no need to adhere to such a decision. 178 Thus,
this prong is inapplicable to the Alperin claims.
f.

Potential Embarrassment from Multifarious Pronouncements

The sixth Baker prong requires dismissal where the court finds "the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.,,179 This prong of the Baker test is
not implicated simply when a court carries out its duty to decide cases
and controversies, even though that might embarrass another branch of
172

173

[d. at 555-556.
[d. at 556.

174 [d. The Supreme Court noted in Sosa v. Alvarez Machain the importance of deferring to
the Executive Branch in cases where the Executive Branch takes a position on the impact of a case
on foreign policy. [d. Sosa was a case brought by a Mexican national against the United States and
the Drug Enforcement Agency for his abduction and rendition to the United States for murder
charges of which he was acquitted. Judge McKeown's opinion in the Ninth Circuit permitting the
case to proceed was overruled by the Supreme Court. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692
(2004) (rev'g Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604 (2003».
175 Alperin, 410 F.3d at 570 (Trott, J. dissenting).
176 [d. at 556, 557.
177 [d. at 557 (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
178

[d.

179

[d. at 558 (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
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government. 180 Rather, the sixth prong prohibits the court from passing
judgment on foreign policy decisions. 181 Again, the court's reasoning is
based on the lack of pronouncements made by the political branches of
government. 182 With that, the majority concluded that the property
claims are not political questions, and are therefore justiciable. 183
2.

The Justiciability of the War Objectives Claims

Included in the war objectives claims are the Holocaust Survivors'
allegations that the Vatican Bank and other defendants "aided and
abetted ... war criminals," "committed war crimes, crimes against peace
and crimes against humanity ... ," showed "a clear pattern of violat[ing]
diplomatic norms ... ," and were involved in or profited from slave
labor. 184
The majority stated: "[w]e are not a war crimes tribunal.,,185 The
Executive Branch pursued and prosecuted war crimes after World War II
and the Judicial Branch should not question the decisions made by the
Executive during that time. 186 The Nuremburg Tribunals were a project
of the Executive Branch, not the Judiciary.18? The Judiciary should not
intrude on any Executive Branch decisions made in the aftermath of
World War II, particularly where it would require the Judiciary to
condemn foreign entities for international crimes, including crimes
against peace and crimes against humanity; those determinations would
intrude on Executive decisions about World War 11.188 Making these
determinations would require the Judiciary to improperly intrude on the
policy choices that are constitutionally committed to the political
branches, namely, that the United States and its allies did not prosecute
180

[d.

181

[d.

182 [d.
The Vatican Bank argues that because the Executive Branch's stated policy is to
resolve World War II claims with diplomacy and negotiations, a judicial decision in this case would
interfere with that policy and cause embarrassment for the Executive. [d. Judge McKeown
responds, however, that courts should not lightly shirk their duty to adjudicate claims, and that
because "this lawsuit is the only game in town with respect to claimed looting and profiteering by
the Vatican Bank," the Court should let the property claims proceed. [d.

183/d.
184

[d. at 559.

at 560.
[d. at 559-560.
187 [d. at 559.
185 /d.

186

188/d. at 559-560. The property claims would simply require a determination of whether
stolen assets are currently held by the defendants, the war objectives claims require a determination
that the behavior of the Vatican Bank and Ustasha constituted, for example, war crimes or genocide.
[d. at 559.
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the Vatican Bank or Ustasha. 189 The court's analysis in this regard is
fundamentally consistent with the very reasons for the political question
doctrine: respect for the separation of powers inherent in the structure of
the federal government.
The court acknowledged difficulty addressing the justiciability of
the slave labor claims. 190 The court's central reasoning regarding the
slave labor claims was that, "[d]etermining whether the Vatican Bank
was unjustly enriched by profits derived from slave labor would . . .
necessitate that we look behind the Vatican Bank and indict the Ustasha
regime for its wartime conduct.,,191 The plaintiffs essentially alleged that
the Ustasha enslaved the plaintiffs, that some of the profit from this slave
labor flowed to the Vatican Bank, and that this profit should be
disgorged. 192 The court thus determined that the slave labor claims were
derivative claims. 193 Because this determination would question the
actions of the Executive Branch following World War II, the court
concluded slave labor claims were political questions. 194
The court also disavowed any suggestion that its decision in Alperin
might create a split with the Second Circuit's decision in Kadic v.
Karadzic. 195 The Kadic decision involved slave labor and forced labor
claims resulting from the actions of the Bosnian-Serb military forces in
the former Yugoslavia. 196 The Second Circuit held the claims were not
political questions. 197 According to Judge McKeown, one important
factor in Kadic that distinguishes the case from Alperin is that the State
Department expressly disavowed any use of the political question
doctrine as a defense against the plaintiffs in that case. 198
3.

The Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Judge Trott

Judge Stephen Trott concurred with the finding that the war
objectives claims should be dismissed as political questions, but
dissented from the majority's holding that the property claims should

1d. at 560 (citing Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1331 (1992».
ld.
191 ld. at 561.
192
1d.
189

190

193

1d. at 560-561.
at 561.

194/d.

Kadic v. Katadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
Kadic, 70 F.3d at 236-237.
197 ld. at 236.
198 Alperin, 410 F.3d at 562 (citing Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249). Also, the Kadic claims involved a
single person, rather than an entire regime during a world war. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249-251.
195

196
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199
proceed.
Judge Trott found the division between property claims and
war objectives claims untenable. 2OO In response to the majority's claim
that, because there is no other process underway to address the Holocaust
Survivors' claims, "this lawsuit is the only game in town,,201 the dissent
stated, "[t]his is not our 'game,' period.,,202 According to Judge Trott,
the silence of the other branches of government should not have any
bearing on whether the Judiciary has jurisdiction over the Holocaust
Survivors' claims, and furthermore, the lack of any relevant executive
agreement is ''meaningless.,,203
The dissent also found the claims to be simply too overwhelming
for judicial scrutiny, requiring dismissal for lack of judicially
manageable standards under the second prong of the Baker analysis. 204
According to the dissent, the decision in Alperin will overwhelm the
Judiciary with claims resulting from the horrors across the world. 205 For
these reasons, Judge Trott agreed with the district court's finding that all
of the Holocaust Survivors' claims were political questions.
III. THE DEMARCATION BETWEEN PROPERTY AND WAR OBJECTIVES
CLAIMS Is A SOUND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Judge Trott, in his dissent to the Alperin majority, recognized that
"[i]t is unlikely that a better case could be made for the majority's view
that some of these matters are justiciable.,,206 Judge McKeown, writing
for the majority, correctly saw a distinction between the more typical
claims involving stolen assets and those claims requiring a determination
of human rights violations?07 Although the United States has an
obligation to render justice for the Holocaust Survivors, Judge McKeown
correctly recognized the difficulties involved in such determinations. 208
The Judicial Branch must, like the other branches of the federal

199
200

201
202
203

Alperin, 410 F.3d at 563 (Trott, J. concurring and dissenting).
[d. (Trott, J. concurring and dissenting).
[d. at 558.
[d. at 565 (Trott, 1. concurring and dissenting) (emphasis in original).
[d. (Trott, J. concurring and dissenting).

204 [d. at 570 (Trott, J. concurring and dissenting). The majority read Vieth differently than
Judge Trott, who found the Holocaust Survivor's claims overwhelming. According to the majority,
the inquiry is whether there are standards based on reasoned distinctions, not whether the claims are
overwhelming. See Part II discussion above of the majority's analysis of Vieth and Judicially
discoverable standards.
205 [d. (Trott, 1. concurring and dissenting).
206 [d. at 563 (Trott, J. concurring and dissenting).
207 !d. at 548.
208 [d. at 562.
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government, permit each branch its proper role. 209
The court in Alperin found a creative solution to the political
question issues with its distinction between war objectives claims and
property claims. The Complaint in this case referred to human rights
violations and violations of international law, not war objectives
claims. 2 \o Nevertheless, the Majority used the phrase "war objectives
claims" to address all of these claims. 211 Nevertheless, the majority
correctly understood that certain claims would require an extensive
analysis of the choices made by the Executive Branch during World War
II and would therefore be nonjusticiable. 212
Adjudication of the property claims does not require an improper
inquiry into the decisions made by the Executive Branch during and after
World War II.213 The same is not true of the war objectives claims. 214
Determining whether genocide, war crimes, crimes against peace, or
crimes against humanity have occurred requires a qualitatively different
analysis; whether the Vatican Bank is liable for such crimes would
require an in depth analysis of the Vaticans' political decisions.
More problematic, determining war objectives claims would require
review of the U.S. President's decision not to pursue such claims after
the termination of World War II. In light of the fledgling Cold War,
those decisions involved the most delicate and subtle political
calculations. 215 For example, Judge McKeown recognized that claims
that the Vatican was involved in ferrying Nazi and Croatian war
criminals to the Western Hemisphere could also easily be alleged against
the United States after World War II.216 Permitting such claims would
question or show disrespect for decisions made by the Executive
Branch.217 The political question doctrine prohibits claims which
embroil courts in analysis of issues where the dispositive factor would be
the soundness of the Executives' political decisions during and following
World War II.218
See e.g. Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 46-47.
Third Amended Complaint by Plaintiff at 'll'll76-97. The cause of action for human rights
violations and violations of intemationallaw in the Holocaust Survivor's Complaint states, among
other things, that "the actions and conduct of Defendants, in addition to being profitable, actively
assisted the war objectives of the Ustasha Regime." Third Amended Complaint by Plaintiff at '1193.
2Il Alperin, 410 F.3d at 558-562.
212 [d. at 562.
213 [d. at 555-556.
214/d. at 559-560.
215 See [d. at 560.
216 [d.
217 [d.
218 [d.
209

210
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This is not to say that the Holocaust Survivors do not deserve relief
for the war objectives claims.2I9 Rather, the Judicial Branch is simply
not equipped to make that decision without offending the constitutional
separation of powers. 220 Whether the Vatican Bank illegally holds funds
or profited from criminal acts may have significant evidentiary hurdles.
However, these issues are distinct from the political question problems
raised, for example, by the claims that the Vatican assisted in ferrying
war criminals out of Europe, which could bring into question the
Executive's political decisions. 221 The court's holding is narrow and
based on sound reasoning.
IV. THE SLAVE LABOR CLAIMS ARE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE
PROPERTY CLAIMS, AND ARE THEREFORE NOT POLITICAL
QUESTIONS

The slave labor claims are more like the property claims than the
war objectives claims. The majority recognized that the slave labor
claims are difficult to categorize?22 Allegations regarding slave labor are
specifically stated in the unjust enrichment cause of action, although
slavery allegations are present throughout the Complaint. 223 Classifying
the slave labor claims as war objectives claims has cursory appeal.
Slavery is a jus cogens norm under international law, so that no treaty or
agreement can vitiate a state's obligation to avoid the use of and punish
the use of slave labor.224 In this way, slavery is very different from
property theft; property theft is a serious violation of law, but it is not
nearly as great a threat to humanity as slavery.
The slavery claims are, however, in many ways dissimilar to the
other war objectives claims. The claims are at least somewhat analogous
to false imprisonment, and could be decided under a similar standard. 225
219

[d. at 562.

Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278 (Scalia, 1. writing for the plurality) (" ... law pronounced by the
courts must be principled, rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions.").
221 Alperin, 410 F.3d at 560.
222 [d.
220

Third Amended Complaint by Plaintiff at 'lI8\.
Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 716 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Indeed,
the supremacy of jus cogens extends over all rules of international law; norms that have attained the
status of jus cogens 'prevail over and invalidate international agreements and other rules of
international law in conflict with them. "') (quoting Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of
the United States § 102 comment k (\987)).
225 For example, the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 35 (2005) states: "( I) An actor is subject
to liability to another for false imprisonment if (a) he acts intending to confine the other or a third
person within boundaries fixed by the actor, and (b) his act directly or indirectly results in such a
confinement of the other, and (c) the other is conscious of the confinement or is harmed by it. (2)
223
224
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In this way, the slave labor claims are more similar to the "garden-

variety" claims of unjust enrichment, conversion, the right to an
accounting, and restitution. 226
Slave labor claims are dissimilar to the other war objectives claims
in other ways. Analyzing crimes against peace or crimes against
humanity requires a much more extensive analysis of political decisions
by governments and institutions than analyzing property claims. Slave
labor claims could be resolved using the same kinds of evidence and
standards required for resolution of the conversion, unjust enrichment,
restitution, and accounting.
Resolution of the slave labor claims is not, unlike the war objectives
claims, committed to a political branch of the government. The majority
states that "[d]etermining whether the Vatican Bank was unjustly
enriched by profits derived from slave labor would ... necessitate that
we look behind the Vatican Bank and indict the Ustasha regime for its
wartime conduct. We are not willing to take this leap.'0227 However, the
same inquiry is required in deciding the property claims. Without
determining whether and how much property was stolen by the Ustasha,
the judiciary would be unable to adjudicate the property claims. To
determine whether property was stolen, the court must look to the
Ustasha's wartime conduct in relation to the plaintiffs.
The majority further distinguished the property and slave labor
claims by suggesting that permitting the slave labor claims would require
evaluation of "the Ustasha's wartime use of slave labor, quantify the
monetary value of this labor, and then determine the portion thereof that
flowed to the Vatican Bank.,,228 With the property claims, the plaintiffs
would only have to show the amount of seized assets which are in the
possession of the Vatican Bank.229 This distinction is not meaningful.
Determining the value of stolen property is not markedly different from
assigning a monetary value to labor or lost wages. 230 Expert witnesses
and historians can testify to the value of labor and to the value of
property. Determining the profit from slave labor which flowed from the
An act which is not done with the intention stated in Subsection (I, a) does not make the actor liable
to the other for a merely transitory or otherwise harmless confinement, although the act involves an
unreasonable risk of imposing it and therefore would be negligent or reckless if the risk threatened
bodily harm."
226 Alperin, 410 F.3d at 548.
227 ld. at 561.
228 ld . at 561 n.18.
229 ld.
230 Courts often examine damage awards for lost wages or earnings; see e.g. Strauss v.
Continental Airlines, Inc., 67 S.W.3d 428, 435 (Tex. App. 2002) ("Loss or impairment of past, as
well as future, earning capacity is recoverable as an element of damages in a personal injury case.").
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Ustasha to the Vatican Bank is not different from determining the
percentage of assets which flowed to the Vatican Bank from stolen
property. Finally, the plaintiffs must offer evidence sufficient to
withstand summary judgment, which is decided at a later stage of the
proceedings than justiciability. If the plaintiffs fail to offer sufficient
evidence, the district court can still dismiss the claims.
The majority also cited the third Baker test, an initial policy
determination, as the basis for dismissal of the slave labor claims.231
According to the majority, "[i]t is not our place to speak for the U.S.
Government by declaring that a foreign government is at fault for using
forced labor during World War II. Any such policy condemning the
Ustasha regime must first emanate from the political branches.,,232 Yet,
as the majority noted in its opinion, the State Department issued a report
detailing many of the Ustasha's activities in an effort "to confront the
largely hidden history of Holocaust-related assets after five decades of
neglect.,,233 This may not be sufficient to qualify as an initial policy
determination, but it is at least a condemnation of the Ushtasha-related
theft of assets.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Holocaust Survivors' allegations that the Vatican Bank and
others profited from crimes committed by the Ustasha during and after
World War II are, at the least, controversial, and have certainly not yet
been proven. Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Alperin v.
Vatican Bank, the Holocaust Survivors' claims still might face dismissal
for reasons other than the political question doctrine. 234 The case is
extremely complicated and potentially massive, considering the large
class spread across many countries. 235
Nevertheless, the political question doctrine should not be a bar to
The Ninth Circuit's
many of the Holocaust Survivors' claims.
distinction between property and war objectives claims was a useful
technique in resolving the political question doctrine issues. However,
the court should have included the slave labor claims within the umbrella
of the property claims, not within the war objectives claims. The
plaintiffs face a difficult task in obtaining relief in this litigation, but the
Alperin, 410 F.3d at 561.
1d.
233 Id. at 540 (citing Ustasha Treasury Report, iii).
234 Alperin. 4\0 F.3d at 538, cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1141 (2006), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
1160 (2006).
235 Alperin, 4 \0 F.3d at 541.
231
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Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2006

25

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 4

44

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

plaintiffs should have a chance to proceed with their case in United
States courts.
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